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Beginning with a general introduction to metaethics, Mark Schroeder escorts the reader through a tour of both the philosophical problems which noncognitivism seeks to solve and the deep problems that it faces, such as prescriptivism, the 'Frege - Geach' problem, expressivism, and relativism. He makes even the most difficult material accessible by offering crucial background along the way.

Also included are exercises at the end of each chapter, chapter summaries, and a glossary of technical terms, making Noncognitivism in Ethics essential reading for all students of ethics and metaethics. Have doubts regarding this product?

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    Most Famous Ethical Puzzle: The Frege-Geach Problem - Philosophy Tube

    Similarly, "Y is what it is," does not express a meaningful proposition. In this sense to claim to believe in X or Y is a meaningless assertion in the same way as, "I believe that colorless green ideas sleep furiously," is grammatically correct but without meaning. Some theological noncognitivists assert that to be an atheist is to give credence to the concept of God because it assumes that there actually is something understandable to not believe in.

    This can be confusing because of the widespread belief in God and the common use of the series of letters G-o-d as if it is already understood that it has some cognitively understandable meaning.

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    • From this view atheists have made the mistaken assumption that the concept of God actually contains an expressible or thinkable proposition. However this depends on the specific definition of God being used. As with ignosticism, the consistent theological noncognitivist awaits a coherent definition of the word God or of any other metaphysical utterance purported to be discussable before being able to engage in arguments for or against God's existence. As with other non-objectivist models of morality , non-cognitivism is largely supported by the "argument from queerness.

      Non-cognitivism - Wikipedia

      Mackie in his book, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Mackie argues against the view that there can be objective ethical values, and he uses the term to describe a certain sort of reductio ad absurdum which belief in such values implies. He states that:. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe J. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, , Hence Mackie argues that this in itself is sufficient reason for doubting their existence.


      Ethical properties, if they existed, would be different from any other thing in the universe, since they have no observable effect on the world. People generally have a negative attitude towards murder—calling it a disgust. This sentiment presumably keeps most of us from murdering. But does the actual wrongness of murder play an independent role? Is there any evidence that there is a property of wrongness that some types of acts have? Some people might think that the strong feelings others have when they see or consider a murder provide evidence of murder's wrongness.

      But it is not difficult to explain these feelings without saying that wrongness was their cause. Thus there is no way of discerning which, if any, ethical properties exist; by Ockham's razor , the simplest assumption is that none do. The non-cognitivist then asserts that, since a proposition about an ethical property would have no referent, ethical statements must be something else. Arguments for emotivism focus on what normative statements express when uttered by a speaker. A person who says that killing is wrong certainly expresses her disapproval of killing.

      The Emotivist claims this is all she does, and that "Killing is wrong" is not a truth-apt declaration.

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      The burden of evidence is on the cognitivists who want to show that in addition to expressing disapproval, the claim "Killing is wrong" is also true. Is there really evidence that killing is wrong? There is evidence that Jupiter has a magnetic field and that birds are oviparous, but as of yet, no one has found evidence of moral properties, such as "goodness.

      Ethical Intuitionists think the evidence comes not from science but from one's own feelings: Good deeds make one feel a certain way and bad deeds make one feel very differently. But is this enough to show that there are genuinely good and bad deeds? The Emotivists think not. One does not need to postulate the existence of moral "badness" or "wrongness" to explain why considering certain deeds makes us feel disapproval.

      All one really observes when one is introspective are feelings of disapproval, so why not adopt the simple explanation and say that this is all there is? Why insist that a genuine "badness" of murder, for example must be causing feelings, when a simpler explanation is available? Arguments for prescriptivism, by contrast, focus on the function of normative statements.

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      A person telling another that killing is wrong probably does not want this other person to then go off and kill someone, and may be explicitly attempting to stop him from doing so. Thus, the statement "Killing is wrong," calculated to prevent someone from killing, can be described as an exhortation not to do so. One argument against non-cognitivism is that it ignores the external causes of emotional and prescriptive reactions. If someone says, "John is a good person," something about John must have inspired that reaction. If John gives to the poor , takes care of his sick grandmother, and is friendly to others, and these are what inspire the speaker to think well of him, it is plausible to say, "John is a good person that is, well thought of because he gives to the poor, takes care of his sick grandmother, and is friendly to others.

      Attempts to translate these complex sentences, which we often use, in an emotivist framework seem to fail. Non-cognitivists need to give adequate accounts for such complex sentences or judgments. Even the act of forming such a construction indicates some sort of cognition in the process.